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Abstract
This article presents a subcarrier allocation scheme based on a Blotto game (SABG) for orthogonal frequency-
division multiple access (OFDMA) networks where correlation between adjacent subcarriers is considered. In the
proposed game, users simultaneously compete for subcarriers using a limited budget. In order to win as many
good subcarriers as possible in this game, users are required to wisely allocate their budget. Efficient power and
budget allocation strategies are derived for users for obtaining optimal throughput. By manipulating the total
budget available for each user, competitive fairness can be enforced for the SABG. In addition, the conditions to
ensure the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium (NE) for the SABG are also established. An low-
complexity algorithm that ensures convergence to NE is proposed. Simulation results show that the proposed low-
complexity SABG can allocate resources fairly and efficiently for both uncorrelated and correlated fading channels.
Keywords: OFDMA, subcarrier allocation, Blotto game, fairness, efficiency, complexity; correlated fading
1. Introduction
The need for more efficient spectrum utilization techni-
ques in wireless networks is becoming increasingly impor-
tant as the number of users continues to grow rapidly
while the radio spectrum remains a scarce resource.
Among the emerging broadband wireless access technolo-
gies, orthogonal frequency-division multiple access
(OFDMA) is a promising technique for efficient utilization
of the available spectrum. Owing to its several attractive
features, OFDMA has been envisaged for possible imple-
mentation in future-generation wireless networks, e.g.,
3GPP-long term evolution [1], cognitive radio networks
[2], and IEEE 802.20 mobile broadband wireless access [3].
By exploiting multiuser diversity, efficient subcarrier
allocation (SA) mechanism can be designed to ensure
quality of service provisioning of multimedia services in
OFDMA systems. Some recent studies on SA schemes
have been reported in [4-7]. Nevertheless, most of the
aforementioned SA schemes focus on throughput maxi-
mization and/or transmit power reduction subject to
some constraints. The fairness issue, however, has largely
been ignored. The deployment of such schemes naturally
gives rise to the following problem: users with better
channel conditions always dominate usage of resources,
causing low throughput for users with poor channel con-
ditions. Thus, the max-min fairness criterion is used in
[8] to maximize the throughput of users with poor chan-
nel conditions, but this approach results in severe spec-
trum inefficiency. To resolve this conflict, Nash
bargaining solution (NBS) [9] is applied where the system
performance is maximized subject to the constraint that
each user is guaranteed a portion of resources. Although
the fairness and efficiency issues have been considered in
the NBS scheme, however, the computational complexity
remains prohibitive for practical mobile applications.
According to [10], the aforementioned types of fairness
that are artificially decided by the system are not truly fair
from the users’ perspective. Hence, competitive fairness is
introduced in [10] using an auction method where each
user competes for the resources and is responsible for its
own action and resulting throughput. Nevertheless,
auction-based spectrum sharing is not appropriate
for multicarrier systems. Han et al. [11] proposed an
enhanced auction-based SA method for OFDMA systems
for achieving high spectrum utilization and ensure compe-
titive fairness. However, previous studies on fairness [8-11]
do not take into account the correlation between adjacent
subcarriers. In fact, spectrum unfairness is more significant
in correlated OFDM channels because the subcarriers
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utilized by a user may experience deep fades simulta-
neously and the use of techniques proposed in [8-11] may
not lead to desired fairness in such scenarios.
In this study, we aim to develop an SA technique
which can achieve a good trade-off performance among
fairness, efficiency, and complexity for both correlated
and uncorrelated OFDMA channels. Unlike the conven-
tional auction method, we propose a multi-dimensional
auction-based subcarrier allocation scheme based on a
Blotto game (SABG) [12] where users simultaneously
compete for subcarriers using a limited budget. In this
game, users need to allocate power and budget wisely
across the available subcarriers to win as many good
subcarriers as possible. Subject to power and budget
constraints, efficient power allocation (PA) and budget
allocation (BA) strategies are derived. Next, we propose
a low-complexity algorithm to guide the SABG to reach
the unique Nash equilibrium (NE) where all the users
can obtain optimal throughput fairly. Besides, by manip-
ulating the amount of budget available for each user,
the SABG can enjoy a good trade-off between through-
put and spectrum fairness. It will be shown via simula-
tion results that the SABG, which is a low-complexity
SA scheme, can allocate more resources fairly and effi-
ciently in both uncorrelated and correlated OFDM
channels as compared to some existing SA techniques.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we outline the system model. Section 3 for-
mulates the SABG and investigates the conditions to
ensure the existence and uniqueness of NE in SABG.
An algorithm that guides the SABG to the unique NE
is proposed in Section 4 and its complexity is analyzed.
Simulation results and performance analysis are pre-
sented in Section 5. We end the article with some con-
cluding remarks in Section 6.
2. System model
We consider the uplink of a single-cell OFDMA system
with one base station (BS) accommodating K users
(transmitters). The available spectrum is divided into N
subchannels each with a bandwidth w which is less than
the coherence bandwidth of the channel such that each
subcarrier experiences flat fading. Besides, the orthogon-
ality between subcarriers is assumed to be preserved
perfectly so that there is no intersymbol interference
between adjacent symbols. In addition, perfect synchro-
nization is assumed so that no intercarrier interference
occurs. We denote the user and subcarrier sets as
K = {1, 2, . . . ,K} and N = {1, 2, . . . ,N}, respectively.
In a typical single-cell OFDMA network, N is always
much larger than K and no subcarrier can simulta-
neously support transmission for more than one user.
Hence, all the users can simultaneously transmit data to
the BS on one or more subcarriers without interfering
each other. In this context, we assume that the BS peri-
odically estimates the uplink channel gains on all sub-
carriers for all the users through pilot signals. The
channel variation on each subcarrier is assumed to be
relatively slow as compared to the channel estimation
rate performed by the BS. With this assumption, the BS
can accurately track the channel state information (CSI)
for all the users on different subcarriers. Furthermore, it
is also assumed that the OFDMA network is geographi-
cally static in the sense that the time scale of algorithm
convergence is shorter than the channel’s coherence
time. Thus, the channel gains on subcarriers remain
unchanged in one implementation of the algorithm.
The available channel is assumed to exhibit frequency-
selective Rayleigh fading where noticeable correlation
between the channel gains of adjacent subcarriers exists.
The subcarrier correlation coefficient between the mth




















where E˜ is the complete elliptic integral of the second
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In Equation 2, σ rmsτ denotes the root-mean-square
channel delay spread normalized by the number of sub-















where Al and τl are the amplitude and time delay for
the lth ray, respectively while L is the total number of
rays for the Rayleigh model.
In the OFDMA system, different subcarriers experi-
ence different channel gains and we denote the unique
channel gain for the kth user on the nth subcarrier as
gnk. If the kth user transmits with power p
n
k on the nth
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where ηnk is the background noise power on the signal
received from the kth user using the nth subcarrier. The













1, if the nth subcarrier is allocated to the kth user
0, otherwise.
(5)
Since each subcarrier is independent of each other and









ank ≤ N (6)
We assume that M-array quadrature amplitude modu-
lation is adopted on the subcarriers and no channel cod-
ing is employed. For a fixed desired bit-error rate
performance, the achievable throughput for the kth user








where Θ = (ln(0.2/BER))/1.5 [9]. The achievable







ingly, the total throughput RT of all the users over all















To date, Equation 8 has been the most common objec-
tive function adopted in the literature [4-7] to quantify
the overall system efficiency. The main focus in these
studies is to maximize the total throughput subject to
some constraints. These proposed SA schemes, however,
suffer from a fairness problem whereby users with good
channel conditions dominate the usage of subcarriers
and deprive users with poor channel conditions of the
opportunity to utilize spectrum.
Thus, an alternative performance metric is needed to
address the unfairness issue. For this reason, we use the
Jain’s fairness index [14], which is a widely used fairness
indicator. In this context, the throughput of all the users
in the OFDMA network is used to compute the Jain’s












where r can range from 1/K (the most unfair case) to
1 (the fairest case).
3. Problem formulation
In game theory, a Blotto game [12] is a two-person
zero-sum game where the players are tasked to simulta-
neously distribute their limited resources over several
objects, and the player allocating the most resources to
an object wins the object. Intuitively, the goal of the
players is to win the highest number of objects and
their resource allocation strategies are crucial in deter-
mining the outcome. The payoff of the game is then
equal to the total number of objects won. In fact, this
game has widely been used to characterize some compe-
titive real environments: allocating campaign budgets for
elections, distributing soldiers for battlefields, etc. In
wireless communications, Blotto game has been first
used to model the PA problem under malicious jam-
ming attacks for cognitive radio networks [15]. In the
last few decades, intensive research effort has been
devoted to study the equilibrium properties of Blotto
games. In [16], a pure-strategy symmetric monotonic
Bayesian equilibrium is found for a Blotto game with
incomplete information. The idea of deriving the equili-
brium point is very constructive and some of the equili-
brium properties are useful in solving the fairness,
efficiency, and complexity problems in the SABG to be
proposed in this article.
3.1 Blotto game formulation
In this study, we extend the two-person Blotto game
into a stochastic K-player Blotto game [16] which is
more appropriate to model the SA problem in the
OFDMA system described in Section 2. In this game,
each user is allocated a total budget of Bmaxk which is to
be spent on N subcarriers subject to the constraint∑N
n=1 b
n
k ≤ Bmaxk where bnk is the BA strategy of the kth
user on the nth subcarrier. The budget could be in the
form of fictitious credit [10] issued by the BS for bid-
ding purposes.
Let SABG = 〈K, {Pk,Bk} , {uk (•)}〉 denote the Blotto
game where K is the index set for the bidders (users),
Pk = [0,Pmaxk ] and Bk = [0,Bmaxk ] are the PA and BA
strategy sets, respectively, while uk(•) is the utility func-
tion for the kth user. In this game, every user tries to
allocate their power and budget to maximize their utility
functions (or win as many subcarriers as possible). To
preserve high efficiency, the users should be encouraged
to win the “good” subcarriers. (Note: “good” subcarriers
refer to the subcarriers with good channel conditions
for a particular user.) In a fair auction, the user who
allocates the highest budget on a subcarrier has the
highest chance to win that subcarrier. Therefore, a
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rational user will always allocate more budget to the
good subcarriers. To achieve competitive fairness and























i is the probability of the kth user


















power and budget vectors for the kth user, respectively,
where pnk ∈ Pk and bnk ∈ Bk. The utility function in Equa-
tion 10 combines PA and BA where pk and bk are both
coupled on each subcarrier and under the budget and
power constraints of each user. Unlike other game theo-
retic approaches, the utility function in Equation 10
does not represent the actual throughput that a user can
achieve at the end of the game. Instead, it provides a
mechanism for users to allocate budget to different sub-
carriers based on their expected throughput on the sub-
carriers. The payoff of a user is equal to the number of
subcarriers won, which is then quantified in the (actual)
throughput.
In the SABG, users compete with each others in an
auction market. Unlike the conventional auctions, the
proposed SABG allows users to simultaneously bid for
all subcarriers. Owing to limited budget, the users need
to spend it wisely to win as many good subcarriers as
possible to maximize their own throughput. To this end,
optimal PA and BA strategies are required for the SABG
such that Equation 10 can be maximized subject to the
















The approach used in [16] to derive the equilibrium
state in Blotto games is adopted in this article to analyze
the proposed PA and BA strategies for the SABG as
given in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: If all the users maximize their utility
function according to Equation 11, then the optimal PA







, ∀n ∈ N (12)
where Δk is the waterfilling level of the kth user and x
+ = max{x,0}. The optimal BA strategy for the kth user















, ∀n ∈ N (13)
Proof: See Appendix.
It is worth mentioning that the PA strategy given in
Equation 12 is found to correspond to the traditional
waterfilling PA techniques which can provide high spec-
tral efficiency [3]. Since the PA strategy is independent
of the BA strategy, the transmit power can be water-
filled onto different subcarriers before implementing
BA.
After BA, the BS which acts as an auctioneer will
assign the available subcarriers to the users based on
their biddings. In general, SA is a combinatorial pro-
blem which requires complex algorithms to obtain the
optimal solution [5,9]. In this study, we modify the bin-
ary constraint in Equation 5 into a probabilistic SA deci-
sion to facilitate design of a low-complexity SA
algorithm. Thus, Equation 5 becomes
ank =
{







Next, we define the set Sk to include all the subcar-




∣∣ank = 1, ∀n ∈ N } (15)
In this section, a fair, efficient, and low-complexity SA
scheme has been proposed. Note, however, that the BA
strategy proposed in Proposition 1 is not symmetrical as
what has been derived in [16]. Therefore, the symmetric
monotonic Bayesian equilibrium in [16] is not applicable
in the SABG. In the following section, we will study the
equilibrium of the SABG.
3.2 Existence and uniqueness of NE in the SABG
In the SABG, the individual user maximizes its own uti-
lity function in a distributed fashion. Since the proposed
PA strategy is independent of the proposed BA strategy
and does not require knowledge of other users’ action
for implementation, the PA is an iterative waterfilling
algorithm without divergence problem. However, the
BA strategy proposed in Equation 13 demonstrates
some strategic interdependence among the users. The
utility function of each user is governed by its own
strategy as well as those of other users. Hence, the BA
which optimizes individual utility also depends on the
BA of other users in the system. Thus, it is necessary to
characterize a set of BA strategies whereby all the users
are satisfied with the utility attained given the BA
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strategies of other users. Such an equilibrium operating
point is called a NE in game theory [17]. The NE con-
cept offers a predictable and stable outcome for a game
where multiple agents with conflicting interests compete
through self-optimization and reach a state from which
no player wishes to deviate [17]. In other words, at a
NE, given the BA of other users, no user can improve
its subcarrier utility level by making individual changes
in the BA. Nevertheless, such a state may not necessarily
exist. Thus, we first need to investigate the existence of
NE in the SABG.
Theorem 1: NE exists in the SABG.
Proof: According to the implicit function theorem
[18], a Jacobian matrix must be non-singular at the
point of existence. By using Equation 13, we define














= 0, ∀k ∈ K, n ∈ N (16)
where Fk, ∀k ∈ K are differentiable functions. Taking
the partial derivative ∂Fk
/
∂bnk, ∀k ∈ K results in -1 on
the main diagonal of the Jacobian matrix while the
























)2 , ∀i ∈ K, i = k (17)
Since rnk 	 1, ∀k ∈ K, n ∈ N (normally in Mbps),
∀i ∈ K∀i ∈ K, i ≠ k is always of the order of 10-3 or
smaller. Therefore, the values of the terms ∂Fk
/
∂bni ,
∀i ∈ K, i ≠ k are extremely small and will only have a
negligible impact on the non-singularity of the corre-
sponding Jacobian matrix. Furthermore, since the Jaco-
bian matrix is a continuous function with respect to rnk,
solutions exist for the entire range of large values of rnk.
In conclusion, by assuming that rnk, ∀k ∈ K, n ∈ N are
large enough, the solution for Equation 16 exists and
hence the existence of NE can be ensured.
We next prove the uniqueness of this NE, which
ensures convergence of the algorithm to be proposed in
Section 4. For this purpose, we use a discrete-time
model where time is divided into iterations and we
assume that all the users only act once in one iteration
and remain static during that iteration. Let bnk (t + 1) and
bnk (t) be the BA strategies of the kth user on the nth
subcarrier at the next and current iterations, respec-




















, ∀k ∈ K, n ∈ N (18)
Using Equaiton 18, the uniqueness of the NE which
exists in the proposed games can be shown next.
Theorem 2: The SABG have the unique NE.
Proof: In [18], it is shown that if a fixed point




exists and if the function f satisfies

















, ∀ε > 1), convergence to a fixed
and unique point is guaranteed. For brevity, we drop
the iteration index t in the following proof. Since all
the elements on the right-hand side (RHS) of Equation









. Next, to prove the monoto-
















































∀i ∈ K, i ≠ k as bnk is a continuous function of bni , ∀i ∈ K,
i ≠ k as shown in Equation 13. However, this decrease
results in an increase in bmk , ∀m ∈ N , m ≠ n because
more budget is available to be spent on other subcar-
riers and users tend to spend all additional budget to
increase the chance of winning more subcarriers. There-
fore, in the second term on the RHS of Equation 19, the
denominator remains the same but the numerator
decreases. Hence, on the RHS of Equation 19, the sec-









and thus the monotoni-
city condition is satisfied. Similarly, to prove the scal-

































Since ε is a scalar multiplication constant for the sum-
mation in the second term on the RHS of Equation 20,
the term remains the same. Hence, the first term on the
RHS of Equation 20 which is multiplied with ε > 1 is









and thus the scalability condition is ful-
filled. Since all the three properties are satisfied, the
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solution which exists in the SABG, and hence the corre-
sponding NE, is unique.
3.3 Properties of the SABG
Some of the useful equilibrium properties in [16] can be
adopted in the SABG and are summarized in the follow-
ing theorem.
Theorem 3: The SABG has the following properties:
1. All users in the SABG will adhere to the BA strat-
egy in Equation 13 if the knowledge of the BA stra-
tegies of other users is not available, but it is
believed that the available budget will be allocated
according to Equation 13.
2. The NE which exists in the SABG has a mono-
tonic property where the user with the highest bud-
get has the highest chance of winning more
subcarriers.
3. All the users in the SABG compete for subcar-
riers. Even a small amount of additional budget
improves the chance of winning more subcarriers.
4. All the users in the SABG tend to fully spend
their budget to increase the chance of winning more
subcarriers.
Proof: Since a unique monotonic equilibrium exists in
the SABG, the latter inherits all the properties of a
Blotto game listed in [16].
From the second property in Theorem 3, the BS can
manipulate the amount of budget available to each user
to achieve different objectives. In this study, we aim to
enforce competitive fairness into the SABG while incur-
ring a minimal loss in total throughput particularly in
correlated fading channels. The following proposition
gives the condition to achieve fairness in the SABG.
Proposition 2: The SABG can achieve competitive
fairness if each user is allocated an equal amount of
budget.
Proof: Consider two users (users 1 and 2) whose
achievable throughputs on two subcarriers are shown in
Figure 1 where r11 − r21 < r12 − r22. According to [11],
competitive fairness can be achieved if their BA strate-









































































































































































































































































2 , it is noted
from the inequalities (23) that Bmax2 < (1 + ε)B
max
1 and
Bmax2 > (1 − ε)Bmax1 such that ε ≈ 0 as rnk (Mbps) are
large enough. Therefore, the only solution that satisfies
the above inequalities is Bmax1 ≈ Bmax2 . This condition is
both necessary and sufficient to achieve competitive fair-
ness in the SABG. According to [11], the proof for the
above two-user case can be extended to the K-user gen-
eral case (K > 2) by introducing multivariable inequal-
ities. Using the same approach above, the solution can
be obtained as Bmax1 ≈ Bmax2 ≈ · · · ≈ BmaxK , as proved in
[11].
In general, the SABG scheme is adaptive and can be
adjusted to reach two extreme states (i.e., maximal-rate
and max-min fairness) by manipulating the budget allo-













(1 − β) rnk + 1
, ∀k ∈ K (24)
where B is the amount of budget allocated by the BS
and 0 ≤ b ≤ 1 is an adjustable coefficient controlled by
the BS. When b = 0.5, it is shown in Equation 24 that
every user is allocated an equal amount of budget and
competitive fairness is attained.
Figure 1 Achievable throughput of users 1 and 2 in a two-
subcarrier network.
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Proposition 3: The throughput achieved by the SABG
approximates maximal-rate throughput if b = 1 while
max-min fairness is achieved by the SABG if b = 0.
Proof: Let b = 1 and Equation 24 indicate that the
amount of budget allocated to every user is proportional
to the achievable throughput where users with better
channel conditions obtain more budget. As shown in
Equation 14, having more budget will increase the prob-
ability of acquiring subcarriers. In other words, subcar-
riers are always allocated to users with the best channel
gains. Instead of assigning subcarriers based on the bud-
get allocated, the SA decision can be modified as
ank =
{







The binary decision in Equation 25 corresponds to the
maximal-rate scheme. On the other hand, let b = 0 and
Equation 24 indicate that the amount of budget allo-
cated to every user is inversely proportional to the
achievable throughput where users with worse channel
conditions obtain more budget. In this scenario, users
with poor channel conditions are assigned more subcar-
riers to improve their throughput. Therefore, Equation
14 can be modified as
ank =
{







where Equation 26 corresponds to the max-min fair-
ness scheme.
4. Proposed algorithm for the SABG
4.1 Algorithms for the SABG
It is noted from Equation 13 that the BA strategies of all
the users are public information, so that the SABG can
be analyzed as a simultaneous-move game with com-
plete information [16]. Given this information, the users
can cheat in the games by purposely allocating budget
slightly higher than the maximum one across all subcar-
riers to win all the subcarriers. To overcome this pro-
blem, we propose a distributed and iterative BA strategy
with incomplete information by rewriting Equation 13
as












Bm (t) − bmk (t)
) , ∀n ∈ N (27)
where Bn(t) is the total budget allocated by all the
users on the nth subcarrier. To update its budget itera-
tively according to Equation 27, the kth user requires to
know its achievable throughput on every subcarrier (rnk,
∀n) and the sum of all users’ allocated budget on every
subcarrier (Bn, ∀n). In this study, we adopt the assump-
tion made in [9] such that a reliable feedback channel
from the BS to every user is available to share this infor-
mation. Using Equation 27, any cheating among the
users can be avoided because each user is unable to pre-
dict others’ strategies by just having the information of
Bn, ∀n.
The SABG algorithm is summarized in Table 1. First,
users allocate budget equally to every subcarrier and
choose the initial powers randomly. The random initial
PA strategies will not cause the algorithm to diverge
because convergence of the SABG algorithm is indepen-
dent of the PA strategy (as shown in Theorem 1). All
the necessary information is obtained from the BS via
the feedback channels. Given all the necessary informa-
tion, the users iteratively update their BA strategies as
in Equation 27 after PA. At each iteration, users need to
submit their biddings to the BS to update Bn(t), ∀n.
This can be done by allowing users asynchronously and
iteratively broadcast a beacon at certain power level on
a subcarrier which corresponds to their budget on that
subcarrier. Using the available CSI, the BS can estimate
the budget allocated by each user on each subcarrier.
Furthermore, it is shown in Table 1 that the condition
∀i ∈ K, ∀i ∈ K, m ∈ N must be fulfilled before NE is
declared where ψ is a convergence threshold. Upon
reaching NE, the BS assigns the subcarriers to the users
paying the highest budget and the users can waterfill
their power to the assigned subcarriers.
4.2 Signaling and computational complexity of the SABG
While allocating budget in the SABG, information
exchange between the BS and users is unavoidable. The
signaling complexity of the SABG is similar to that of
the iterative auction-based spectrum sharing [19], which
has been proven to be feasible for practical implementa-
tion. In addition, our algorithm is more favorable than
that of [19] becaue of rapid convergence (to be proven
in Section 5).
In [9], the NBS approach adopts cooperative game
theory that requires users to negotiate and form coali-
tions to obtain the optimal solution. However, this
results in high computational complexity. The Hungar-
ian method is therefore introduced to the NBS scheme
for reducing the overall complexity to O((K2N log2N
+K4)TNBS) where TNBS is the number of iterations
required for the NBS algorithm to converge. Neverthe-
less, the NBS approach is still not feasible for mobile
applications particularly in the network with large num-
ber of users and subcarriers because its complexity is
exponential to the number of users and subcarriers. In
this study, the SABG algorithm is proposed to solve the
complexity problem. Based on the algorithm summar-
ized in Table 1, the overall complexity of the SABG is O
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((2TWF + 2TBA + 1)KN) where TWF and TBA are the
numbers of iterations required for the waterfilling PA
and BA algorithms to converge, respectively. Unlike the
NBS scheme, the complexity of the SABG increases lin-
early with the number of users and subcarriers.
5. Simulation results
In the simulation setup for the uplink of a single-cell
OFDMA system, the cell radius is assumed to be 1 km
and the BS is placed at the center of the cell within
which the users are uniformly distributed. To model a
urban non-line-of-sight propagation environment, we
use the path loss exponent, v ∼ U (3, 5). The shadowing





σs ∼ U (4,10)[20]. We simulate a correlated frequency-
selective Rayleigh fading channel using an exponential
power-delay profile which has σ rmsτ = 0.1 µs[12]. Each
subchannel has a bandwidth w = 25 kHz and the symbol
duration is 40 μs [9]. Each user deploys an isotropic
transmitter with a maximum power of Pmaxk = 50 mW
and the desired error probability at the output of the
16-QAM demodulator is BER = 10-4. The background
noise is assumed to be additive white Gaussian noise of
ηnk ∼ N
(
4 × 10−12). For convergence, ψ = 10-5 is used.
To enforce competitive fairness, we assume that the BS
always allocates an equal amount of budget to every
user, Bmaxk = 1, ∀k ∈ K. Each curve is obtained as the
average of 1,000 channel realizations. For each
realization, the SABG algorithm is implemented and
convergence is achieved within one realization.
We first show the convergence curves of the proposed
SABG algorithm for uncorrelated and correlated OFDM
channels in Figure 2a,b, respectively, where an OFDMA
system with K = 10 and N = 32 is considered. Each
curve in these subfigures corresponds to the total bud-
get allocated by all the users on each subcarrier. Initially,
each user allocates equal amount of budget to every
subcarrier and the budget allocated on each subcarrier
is seen to monotonically converge to the unique NE.
After the tenth iteration, optimal BA is achieved by the
SABG and this verifies Theorems 1 and 2 by showing
that the proposed algorithm always converges to the
unique NE. Next, we investigate the convergence speed
of the SABG for different network scales (with different
K and N values) in uncorrelated and correlated OFDM
channels. For both channels, it is observed in Figure 2c,
d that the number of iterations needed for convergence
increases linearly with K and N. An important advantage
of the proposed algorithms is that when K and N are
large (typically K > 25 and N > 128), the convergence
speed becomes independent of network scales and less
than or equal to 13 iterations are required to achieve
convergence.
As proved in Proposition 2, the BS needs to allocate
an equal amount of budget for every user to achieve
competitive fairness. To emphasize the importance of
Table 1 The SABG algorithm
1. Initialization
User k obtains Bmaxk from the BS and randomly select p
n
k (0), ∀n ∈ N ,. Let bnk (0) = Bmaxk
/
N, ∀n ∈ N and t = 1
2. PA strategy
Based on the CSI obtained from the BS, user k waterfills its power to all subcarriers according to Equation 12
3. BA strategy
User k obtains the information (Bn (t − 1) , ∀n ∈ N ) from the BS
For m = 1,...,N




User k sends the bidding information to the BS
4. Convergence
For i = 1,...,K
For m = 1,...,N
The BS checks if




For m = 1,...,N
The BS assigns subcarrier m to user k according to Equation 14.
End
6. Power allocation
User k waterfills its power to subcarrier n using Equation 12 for n ∈ Sk.
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this proposition, we illustrate the impact on spectrum
fairness due to asymmetrical BA by the BS in a two-
user network with 64 subcarriers. From Figure 3a, we
note that when User 1’s available budget is less than
that of User 2, the spectrum is dominated by User 2.
This scenario is conjectured in the second property of
Theorem 3 that a user with a higher budget has a higher
chance to win every subcarrier. Therefore, a low Jain’s
fairness index is obtained in this scenario as shown in
Figure 3c. By gradually increasing the budget for User 1,
the fairness index increases as User 1 has more budget
to compete for subcarriers. The fairness index
approaches 1 as the amount of budget available for User
1 is equal to that of User 2. A further increase in the
budget of User 1 will cause unfairness to User 2 because
the spectrum would then be dominated by User 1. In
Figure 3b, note that the highest total throughput can be
acquired when the BS allocates budget equally to the
two users. This further encourages the BS to implement
symmetrical BA to every user, not only for achieving
competitive fairness, but also for attaining high spectral
efficiency.
Next, we evaluate the performance of the SABG in
both uncorrelated and correlated OFDM channels. To
achieve competitive fairness, b = 0.5 is used. The BA
strategy adopted by the users are based on Equation 27.
Figure 4 shows the total throughput and fairness index
versus the number of users in a system with 128 subcar-
riers for the maximal-rate, max-min, NBS, and SABG
schemes. Owing to multiuser diversity, it is observed in
Figure 4a,b that the performance of these four schemes
gradually improves when the number of users increases.
In an uncorrelated OFDM channel, it is shown in Figure
4a,c that the SABG has a similar performance to that of
the NBS scheme in terms of efficiency and fairness. On
the other hand, Figure 4b,d shows that the SABG is
more spectrally efficient and fair than the NBS approach
in a correlated OFDM channel. In this channel, a sce-
nario where all the subcarriers of a user are in deep fade
may arise. The NBS scheme fails to attain a good trade-
off between fairness and efficiency because of the
requirement to fulfill minimum rate for every user. In
SABG, however, the manipulation of the budget avail-
able for each user allows them to compete fairly and the








































































(a) Uncorrelated OFDM Channel (b) Correlated OFDM Channel
(c) Uncorrelated OFDM Channel (d) Correlated OFDM Channel
Figure 2 Convergence curves of the SABG for (a) uncorrelated and (b) correlated OFDM channels; convergence speed of the SABG
algorithms for (c) uncorrelated and (d) correlated OFDM channels.
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Figure 3 Impact of different budgets on (a) individual throughput, (b) total throughput, and (c) fairness in a two-user OFDMA system.
















































Maximal-rate Max-min NBS SABG
(b) Correlated OFDM Channel(a) Uncorrelated OFDM Channel
(c) Uncorrelated OFDM Channel (d) Correlated OFDM Channel
Figure 4 Comparison of total throughput and fairness index for the maximal-rate, max-min, NBS and SABG schemes in uncorrelated
and correlated OFDM channels.
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willingness to pay in this auction environment guaran-
tees the best set of subcarriers for every user.
In Figure 5, the overall complexities of the NBS and
SABG schemes are compared. The NBS and SABG algo-
rithms are implemented in the similar correlated OFDM
channel and their complexities are computed upon their
convergence. From Figure 5, it is observed that the over-
all complexity of the SABG increases linearly with K and
N. Though the order of complexity of the SABG is simi-
lar to that of the maximal-rate and max-min fairness
schemes, the overall complexity of the SABG is slightly
higher because of the iterative PA and BA algorithms.
On the other hand, the overall complexity of the NBS
scheme increases exponentially with K and N. Even
though the convergence speed of the SABG is slower
than that of the NBS scheme, the SABG attains a much
lower overall complexity than that of the NBS scheme.
Hence, the SABG is more favorable and feasible for
practical implementation, particularly in a network with
large K and N.
Figure 6 shows the trade-off performance between
spectrum fairness and spectral efficiency in a system
with 128 subcarriers. Let b = 1, the BS allocates budget
to every user as in Equation 24. Now, the SABG acts
like the maximal-rate scheme by assigning subcarriers to
users with good channel gains without considering fair-
ness. Thus, it is observed in Figure 6a,c that the total
throughput achieved by the SABG is comparable to that
of the maximal rate scheme, but the former has poor
performance in preserving spectrum fairness. To
approximate max-min fairness, let b = 0 and the BS
allocates budget to every users as in Equation 24. As
shown in Figure 6b,d, the fairness achieved by the
SABG approximates max-min fairness but it suffers
from a large performance loss in total throughput. This
is because more subcarriers are assigned to users with
poor channel conditions to improve their throughput,
and hence the performance gap among the users is
reduced. In conclusion, by manipulating b, the SABG
can enjoy a flexible trade-off between spectral efficiency
and spectrum fairness.
6. Conclusion
In this article, the SA problem in OFDMA networks has
been studied in a realistic channel model which consid-
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Figure 5 Computational complexity of the NBS and SABG algorithms under different number of users and subcarriers.
Tan et al. EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 2011, 2011:53
http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2011/1/53
Page 11 of 14
shown that spectrum unfairness is more severe in corre-
lated fading channels than in uncorrelated ones. To
enforce competitive fairness in correlated fading chan-
nels while attaining high spectral efficiency and main-
taining low complexity, we have proposed the SABG in
which all the users simultaneously compete for the
available subcarriers using a limited budget. Efficient PA
and BA strategies have been derived for users for
obtaining optimal throughput fairly. By manipulating
the amount of budget available for each user, the SABG
can enjoy a good trade-off between spectral efficiency
and spectrum fairness. If the BS allocates equal amounts
of budget to all users, then the fairest spectrum sharing
among users can be enforced at a minimal loss in total
throughput. The SABG has been shown to be more
favorable than the existing SA schemes because of its
high efficiency, fairness assurance, and low complexity.
Simulation results demonstrate that the SABG algorithm
can converge rapidly to the unique NE where upon
reaching this point, subcarriers can be allocated fairly
and efficiently to every user.
Appendices
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Using Lagrangian relaxation, Equation 11 can be rewrit-
ten as

























where ak and μk are the positive Lagrangian multi-
pliers. Taking the partial derivative of (A1) with respect





















From Equation A3, note that pnk is constrained by


























































(b) Max-min Case(a) Maximal-rate Case
(c) Maximal-rate Case (d) Max-min Case
Figure 6 Approximation of the SABG to the maximal-rate (b = 1) and max-min (b = 0) schemes in a correlated OFDM channel.
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From Equations A3 and A4, we notice that the PA
strategy can be modeled using the waterfilling algorithm
[3]. Let μk(t+1) = (μk(t)-ξ(t)Dk(t))
+ be the subgradient
update methods where ξ(t) > 0 are the update steps
while Dk(t) is




We can decouple the PA from BA by fixing bk while














i is the waterfilling level of
the kth user. Specifically, for N number of subcarriers,












From Equation A6, it is noticed that the PA and BA
can be decoupled and thus the BA strategy can be
viewed as a one-dimensional maximization problem
with pk fixed. Taking the partial derivatives of Equation






























































⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ rNk = αk(A10)
Without loss of generality, Equation A10 can be rear-



















i is the total budget allocated by all
users on the nth subcarrier. By rearranging Equation





















where Bi is the total budget spent by the ith user and
B is the total budget spent by all users on all subcar-

































B = CnkB (A15)
The ratio of Equation A10 for the jth user over that of









































































rnk (B − Bk)
(A19)
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+ bnkB (K − 1)
⎞⎠ (A22)














If we assume that the total available budget will be















, ∀n ∈ N (A24)
The proposed BA strategy is thus obtained.
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